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T

he past year has witnessed a renewed emphasis by US government agencies addressing the threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In
December 2009, the Obama Administration released its second presidential
policy directive, a “National Strategy to Counter Biological Threats,” which
addressed the challenge of combating infectious diseases, regardless of
whether they were natural or manmade. In February 2010, the Quadrennial
Defense Review stressed how the proliferation of WMD “continues to
undermine global security.” In April, the Nuclear Posture Review was released for the first time as an unclassified document, along with a newly
signed Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, reducing the deployable number
of Russian and US nuclear weapons. In May, representatives from across
the globe met to renew the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which attempts
to reduce (and eventually eliminate) the total number of nuclear-owning
weapon states in the world. It has been a busy spring.
During talks related to these initiatives, President Barack Obama
directly connected the threat of nuclear terrorism to the success of nuclear
proliferation efforts. He declared, “The greatest threat to US and global
security is no longer a nuclear exchange between nations, but nuclear terrorism by violent extremists and nuclear proliferation to an increasing number
of states.”1 The current focus on nonproliferation activities, however, does
not stop terrorists from seeking and potentially obtaining nuclear and biological materials, technology, and devices. For that matter, the emphasis on
combating terrorism has not resulted in a reduction of terrorist ambitions
to obtain these materials, either. The US government, and the Department
of Defense (DOD) in particular, needs to review its strategy to combat
weapons of mass destruction.
The combating WMD framework is based on a counterproliferation strategy developed in response to the threat of nuclear, biological, and
Albert J. Mauroni is a senior policy analyst working on military chemical and
biological defense policy issues.
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chemical (NBC) weapons to military forces in the 1990s, however, its scope
was broadened after September 2001 to address concerns relating to homeland security. For all the talk about “the most dangerous weapons in the hands
of the most dangerous people,” there has been little discussion on whether
the combating WMD strategy is adequate against current and future threats.
This article will review the development of the combating WMD strategy
from its initiation in the 1990s, as a result of the post-conflict analysis of
the Persian Gulf War in 1991. It will outline the creation of the combating
WMD strategy during the George W. Bush Administration. The article focuses on challenges in interpretation, largely due to the thesis that terrorists
were actively seeking WMD materials and technology from “rogue states”
that had developed this capability (or were in the process of doing so). Last,
it will offer suggestions on how to improve the framework, largely by defining the strategy to counter nation-state WMD programs as distinct from the
strategy to counter terrorist pursuit of WMD. If the US government clearly
articulates these two strategies as separate but related, as opposed to being
one single strategy to counter WMD, the agencies responsible for executing
these strategies will be much more effective.
Genesis of DOD’s Combating WMD Strategy
In 1993, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) initiated a
Defense Counterproliferation Initiative with the image of ill-prepared US
forces facing Iraq’s chemical and biological (CB) weapons still fresh in its
mind. There was some initial concern by the nonproliferation community
that DOD was attempting to usurp its role that a focus on developing offensive and defensive capabilities to counter adversarial use of CB weapons
would come at the cost of reducing nonproliferation efforts.2 After a few
years of discussion, OSD tasked the Joint Staff in 1996 to develop a counterproliferation strategy, stating in Defense Planning Guidance that “all US
forces must be prepared to conduct wartime operations against adversaries
armed with chemical or biological weapons. Forces must be trained and
equipped to maintain the effectiveness of Joint and combined operations
despite the presence, threat, or use of CBW [chemical-biological warfare]
by an adversary. Furthermore, US forces must be capable of managing the
consequences of an adversary’s use of CBW weapons.”3
Elaborating on that direction, the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review
stated, “To advance the institutionalization of counterproliferation concepts, the Joint Staff and CINCs [commanders-in-chief] will develop an
integrated counter-NBC weapons strategy that includes both offensive and
defensive means.”4 The review’s focus was on the proliferation of NBC weapons to adversarial states. The Joint Staff spent some four years developing a
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counterproliferation strategy through a team led by US Strategic Command
and US Special Operations Command representatives.
The
counterproliferation
strategy initially focused on three acThe US government needs tivities: proliferation prevention (DOD
to review its strategy
activities under nonproliferation), ofto combat WMD.
fensive capabilities (counterforce), and
defensive capabilities (active and passive defense). Essentially, counterforce operations would attack WMD sites
and weapon systems prior to their use on the battlefield, while active defense
(primarily air and missile defense) would intercept any incoming delivery
systems containing NBC warheads. Passive defense included those actions
taken by military personnel to protect themselves against a successful release of NBC weapons.
In response to concern regarding terrorist incidents,5 the US government updated its Federal Response Plan in 1997 to address the possibility of
terrorist use of chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) materials within the United States.6 Accordingly, the Joint Staff expanded its
counterproliferation strategy to address DOD’s responsibility to support the
“lead federal agency”7 responding to a domestic terrorist incident, as well
as any long-term actions necessary to mitigate effects resulting from the use
of NBC weapons in combat operations (e.g., restoring contaminated equipment and fixed sites to pre-incident condition).8 Defense Secretary William
Cohen’s intense interest in consequence management led to the concept of
National Guard WMD Civil Support Teams to assist state and local emergency responders.9 As a result, the counterproliferation strategy identified
four military capabilities: counterforce, active defense, passive defense, and
consequence management. It was designed to offer the US military an integrated set of operational capabilities that would counter the ambitions and
offensive capabilities of adversaries in Southwest Asia and Northeast Asia,
as opposed to earlier scenarios involving combat operations against the former Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact.
The counterproliferation strategy was intended to “protect US forces
and interests …should they confront an adversary armed with WMD.” This
strategy would include “activities of the Department of Defense across the
full range of US government efforts…including the application of military
power…intelligence collection and analysis, and support to diplomacy, arms
control, and export controls.”10 It emphasized the preservation of US military capabilities while in combat with nation-states possessing CB weapons.
Counterproliferation was intended to complement nonproliferation activities, recognizing the primacy of arms-control negotiations as the preferred
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forum for addressing the WMD threat. The Director of the Joint Staff signed
the Joint Staff’s counterproliferation strategy in February 2001.
From Strategy to Execution
The tragic attacks in New York City and Washington, D.C., on 11
September 2001 directly impacted the Bush Administration’s national security perspective. Some people feared that terrorists would escalate to using
CBRN weapons in US cities as a continuation of mass-casualty events.
Casualties resulting from anthrax-filled letters sent to media and congressional offices in October and November 2001 solidified these fears.11 In
its review of the Joint Staff’s counterproliferation strategy, the National
Security Council made a few significant changes and promulgated National
Security Policy Directive 17, “National Strategy to Combat Weapons of
Mass Destruction,” later released in an unclassified form in December
2002.12 This national strategy declared that terrorist groups were pursing
WMD capabilities through “rogue states” that were developing or had the
capability to produce NBC weapons. The first policy change was that the
new strategy would address both military and homeland security concerns
relating to WMDs.
The National Security Council split consequence management out
of the Joint Staff counterproliferation strategy to be a standalone “pillar” of
its new combating WMD strategy. The newly formed Office of Homeland
Security considered the threat of terrorist use of CBRN hazards to be a top
concern. Its worst-case scenarios envisioned foreign-based terrorists gaining
military-grade CB warfare agents or a nuclear bomb from a “rogue state,”
transporting the weapons to the United States, and releasing them in major cities. The national strategy re-emphasized the need for a robust federal
response to a domestic CBRN incident, turning the consequence management pillar into a much more complex function than merely another DOD
response capability.
In July 2002, the Bush Administration released a National Strategy
for Homeland Security and in February 2003, a National Strategy for
Combating Terrorism. Both documents identified responsibilities to address combating WMD terrorism—the former focusing on preventing
terrorist attacks within the United States, and the latter on identifying and
defusing threats outside of the country. The Government Accountability
Office called the inclusion of WMD in multiple government strategies
an effort to provide “cohesion by sharing common themes,” but this assessment was overly generous.13 The duplicative language was causing
chaos among government offices charged with carrying out the various
strategies. For instance, DOD has three distinct policy offices to address
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homeland defense, combat terrorism, and combat WMD proliferation, as
well as larger, distinct communities of interest on each topic. These communities have different political agendas, operating concepts, and budgetary
authorities, and all have conflicting views about what “combating WMD”
means and how to execute their specific responsibilities.14
Other federal agencies also have roles and responsibilities to combat WMD and WMD terrorism, with each agency developing its own set
of definitions and operational concepts. The Bush Administration created
a National Counterproliferation Center in 2005 to address WMD proliferation distinct from the National Counterterrorism Center’s focus on
terrorists seeking WMD capabilities. While these two centers discuss common issues, they operate independently of each other. The many federal
and state definitions of WMD make it difficult for federal agencies to
agree on how to work together, especially with respect to coordinating
agendas and projects. These differences exist today, largely unresolved.15
This internal government debate caused years of delay between the release
of the December 2002 National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass
Destruction and the February 2006 National Military Strategy to Combat
Weapons of Mass Destruction.16
Adding to the debate, the Bush Administration had developed the
concepts of “WMD elimination” and “WMD interdiction” as new components under the strategy to combat WMD. During Operation Iraqi Freedom
in 2003, the Defense Department deployed a WMD Exploitation Task Force
that was, at best, a rushed effort that lacked a sufficient concept of operations and good intelligence.17 After this task force and the Iraq Survey Group
failed to find anything but “WMD-related program activities and significant
amounts of [related] equipment,”18 Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld
charged US Strategic Command in January 2005 with coordinating and
synchronizing DOD’s efforts to combat WMD, starting with the development of operational concepts for WMD elimination and interdiction.19 This
step raised the number of distinct mission areas within the combating WMD
strategy from six to eight.20
Countering Terrorist WMD Threats
The US government’s approach to combating WMD terrorism
needs similar scrutiny. The US government fixates on scenarios that envision terrorist use of ten-kiloton nuclear weapons, large releases of anthrax
and smallpox, and extensive use of nerve and mustard agents in heavily
populated US cities, worst-case scenarios that have little basis in reality.
In February 2003, the Secretary of the newly established Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) told the American public to buy sheets of
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plastic and duct tape to create “safe rooms” within their houses as protection
against CBRN terrorism, causing a mad rush to stores, despite any evidence
of terrorist plans. The homeland security approach to develop protective
measures against CBRN incidents is based on the DOD passive defense
construct, assuming that terrorists will use military-style NBC weapons to
simultaneously cause mass casualties in multiple cities.
The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) developed
and stockpiled medical countermeasures for civilian casualties, focusing on
the same military threats that DOD addresses.21 DHHS has only stockpiled
two vaccines in the face of a dozen significant biological warfare agents,
however. DHS has positioned radiological monitors and biological detectors around the country and issued financial grants for state and local
emergency responders to obtain specialized detectors, protective suits and
masks, and decontamination systems for CBRN hazards. Only 30-odd cities across the United States have biological detectors; the overwhelming
majority of cities with a population more than 100,000 do not, due mainly
to concerns regarding detector false alarms and associated costs.22 The
Government Accountability Office has commented on the shortcomings of
DHS’s radiological detectors and its failure to develop a federal capability to
recover from radiological incidents.23 The current concept is not sustainable
nor does it adequately protect the majority of the US public from CBRN
incidents, but a “Maginot Line” of radiological and biological detectors was
the wrong concept to begin with.
Civil-defense discussions in the 1960s and 1970s addressed ambitious plans for national shelter and antimissile defense programs that were
supposed to protect the public from the impact of Soviet bombers and
ballistic missiles carrying nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. It
would have cost billions of dollars to protect the entire nation. Congress
never fully funded these efforts because its members were not convinced
that the programs would be justified, even though the shelters may have
saved millions of lives, had a Soviet nuclear strike occurred. Back then,
as now, states and cities were more worried about recovering from natural
disasters and paying for restoration efforts. This is still the case today. No
one has considered these history lessons in crafting today’s “consequence
management” policies.
DOD planners assume that they have to deploy specially trained
forces within the first 24 to 72 hours following an attack, as if state and local emergency responders will be unable to perform their responsibilities in
this complex environment. DOD plans to equip more than 10,000 technical
specialists in various operational units to be prepared to assist and respond
to multiple, simultaneous terrorist CBRN incidents across the entire United
States. The utter absence of any terrorist CBRN incident of any scale since
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2001 does not seem to register as a concern, despite the significant resources
and time involved in training these forces.
The debate over DOD’s consequence management role has been
controversial since inception in 1998. Following a CBRN attack or incident, the military has to restore critical services at its bases and installations
(battlefield consequence management); support a host nation to reinstate its
critical services (foreign consequence management); or support a state or local authority within the United States to regain its critical services (domestic
consequence management). The US government has developed a “wholeof-government” approach to incident and disaster management using an
“all-hazards” approach. Conversely, the Department of Defense’s approach
has been to assume that its forces are the only ones technically capable of
executing the full breadth and depth of federal responsibilities while responding to multiple, simultaneous, mass-casualty CBRN incidents. The
assumption is that no other federal agency or host nation will assist.
Developing a New National Strategy
Criticism regarding use of the term Global War on Terrorism
should have reminded DOD leaders that they cannot fight a tactic or a
weapon system. To counter the threat of WMDs effectively, one requires
discrete and focused strategies aimed at specific adversaries who wish
to employ such weapons. One needs to develop a strategy to counter
CBRN terrorism that is distinct from the strategy to counter nation-state
development of NBC weapons. This measure is necessary to stop the
intradepartment and interagency squabbling over roles and responsibilities
concerning counter-WMD issues, as well as to define a common lexicon
on WMD terms and capabilities.24
A new national strategy to counter WMDs should be composed of four
pillars: strategic deterrence (using nuclear and non-nuclear precision-strike
capabilities), nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and related defense-industrial infrastructure. Nonproliferation mission areas should include security
cooperation and partner activities (to include WMD interdiction) and threat
reduction cooperation (to include WMD elimination). Counterproliferation
mission areas would include offensive operations, active defense, passive
defense, and incident management. This construct basically takes the “new
nuclear triad” construct identified in the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review and
adds nonproliferation activities.25 The Obama Administration is developing
its nuclear-weapons strategy as a complement to its nonproliferation goals.
A counter-WMD strategy should similarly link the two topics. Strategic deterrence should be the primary counter to WMD capability, with tailored,
regional plans against specific nation-states. These counter-WMD mission

64

Parameters

A Counter-WMD Strategy for the Future

areas are fairly well defined, if not robustly supported, and also require a
tailored, regional focus.
The role of strategic deterrence needs to be intimately linked with
the counter-WMD strategy. During the Cold War, US policy was definitive
regarding the role of nuclear weapons as a deterrent to adversarial use of
WMDs. Between 1992 and 2008, national policy on the employment of
nuclear weapons failed to evolve with the transformation of the operating
environment. The primary role of strategic nuclear weapons is to secure the
United States from nuclear attack. This basic concept has to be addressed
within a national counter-WMD strategy. This is not to say that global precision-strike capabilities (or, for that matter, the national missile defense
program) should be subordinate to countering-WMD policy. The overall
national strategy has to articulate and link all aspects of government interest and policy relevant to the two distinct goals of countering nation-state
WMD programs and countering terrorist use of CBRN hazards.
The concepts of WMD elimination and interdiction need to be
reviewed against their stated policy objectives. Despite statements of
“successes” in the Proliferation Security Initiative, there has not been any
significant interdiction of WMD material or related technologies since
the 2003 interception of a German freighter headed to Libya with nuclear
centrifuge parts. The initiative lacks clear authorities and transparency,
and only addresses commercial, not government, transportation.26 In addition, the maritime and ground interdiction exercises have been limited to
nuclear materials and nuclear weapon-related technologies; there are no nonobtrusive scanners or sensitive monitors to detect the presence of chemical
or biological materials. The current approach ignores more pressing global
concerns of illegal arms shipments, drug smuggling, human slave trade,
and other criminal activities. As global economies flourish and information technology continues to grow, nations desiring a WMD capability will
merely develop indigenous means of production or rely on air transport
from existing nuclear states.
WMD elimination is focused on addressing programs within “failing regimes” and loose CBRN hazards that might be found in the “global
commons.” In 2002, the Bush Administration wanted to quickly capture and
assess aspects of Iraq’s offensive CB weapons program prior to the completion of combat operations. With Iraq’s WMD program dismantled, is there
a new challenge? A WMD elimination capability might do nicely if North
Korea collapses, but then what?27 Pakistan’s nuclear stockpile is much more
secure than the exaggerated stories of its vulnerability to Taliban attacks
suggest. No one seriously sees such an elimination capability as being required for Iran, China, Israel, Russia, or any other nation-state suspected of
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having an offensive program. The elimination effort, however, would not be
a US-only, DOD-led effort as were similar activities in 2003.
One has to question whether WMD elimination and interdiction are
enduring missions or would be better developed as contingency plans focused
on a few specific “rogue nations.” If the DOD is required to interdict WMD
material or technology or eliminate a nation-state’s program, these efforts
should be international and interagency-based. The required expertise and
capabilities can be quickly developed and executed under an international
task force as required. It is time to drop the unsubstantiated views on “rogue
nation” WMD programs and their alleged use of international networks of
commerce and information to funnel materials and technologies to terrorist
groups. WMD interdiction and elimination are specialty functions, both of
which could be subsumed within nonproliferation activities.
Addressing Consequence Management
This construct proposes that consequence management be integrated
back under counterproliferation as “incident management,” rather than standing as a unique and separate “pillar.” To be clear, DOD requires a capability
to restore critical services on US military installations and facilities that have
been impacted by the use of NBC weapons or the use of improvised CBRN
devices employed by terrorist organizations. Attempts to discuss WMD consequence management have been fruitless, because they take place outside
of the context of overall incident management. It is the constant attempts to
address CBRN terrorism response outside of the context of incident management, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief concepts and plans
that regularly frustrate the DOD’s attempts to rationally manage, resource,
and execute this mission. The Department of Defense needs to stop the
circular debates over “domestic versus foreign” consequence management
by moving its technical specialists into the mainstream.
DOD support to a federal response to a domestic CBRN incident
should be addressed as military support to civil authorities, and its support
to a host nation affected by a foreign CBRN incident should be addressed
as humanitarian assistance/disaster relief. These capabilities need to be designed to reflect realistic resource and time constraints that acknowledge
DOD as a support, not lead, agency. In 1995, it was the only agency that had
adequate technical capabilities and specialists trained to respond to these
kinds of incidents. In part due to the efforts of DHS and private industry,
that is not the case today. The role that DOD forces play in support to the
federal response to a CBRN terrorist incident within the United States needs
to be separately addressed under the counter-WMD terrorism strategy, as it
66

Parameters

A Counter-WMD Strategy for the Future

is in today’s National Response Framework. Defense planners should focus
on supporting the restoration of critical and essential government services
by deploying its forces during the 72- to 96-hour timeframe of any future
incident, rather than fixating on “saving lives,” a role better left to the state
and local emergency responders.
Examining the recent DOD support to relief operations in Haiti, it
should be clear that the real value of defense’s support to federal agencies responding to incidents, accidents, and disasters is its general logistics, medical,
and security support, not its technical specialists. Because technical specialists are leading the consequence-management discussion, unique terms and
concepts are developed outside of mainstream processes. The department’s
failure to realistically scope the problem and address CBRN hazards within
the DHS National Response Framework, combined with an unhealthy penchant for redefining the concept every other year with little regard to resource
constraints or to interagency and international partner capabilities, will continue to retard development of a sound incident management concept.
DOD does require a capability to restore mission-critical equipment and fixed sites that have been contaminated by CBRN hazards to
pre-incident conditions. This capability is very demanding in terms of time,
manpower, and resources; as a result, there has been little desire to invest
the capital required to achieve this capability. In addition, the debate over
“how clean is safe” (relating to standards for unprotected exposure to formerly contaminated material) has never been resolved into quantifiable
standards. In 1997, US Transportation Command asked the Joint Staff to
assist in developing decontamination standards and policies to address the
issue of contaminated strategic airlift and sea transportation. While incremental measures have been taken, OSD needs to intervene in the polarized
arguments between the medical community, which insists on very low exposure risks intended to protect an individual’s health and future welfare, and
the operational community, which wants to accept a higher risk of exposure
in return for the ability to execute missions with less physical degradation.
Until DOD develops quantifiable decontamination standards, the US government will lack necessary interagency and international CBRN standards for
restoration and remediation.
A New Approach to Counter WMD Terrorism
A second national strategy to “counter WMD terrorism” should
be similarly composed of four pillars: international cooperation and extremist group containment, combating terrorism, homeland defense, and
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civil support/emergency preparedness. This construct promotes the goals
of reducing the overall risk of terrorism through traditional diplomacy and
combating terrorism efforts; developing measures to secure CBRN materials and “dual-use” technologies; protecting noncombatants and critical
infrastructure; and improving societal resilience to the potential impact
of CBRN incidents. The State Department and US Special Operations
Command already recognize that the central approach to reduce the threat
of CBRN terrorism is to, in fact, “deter, detect, defeat, and respond to terrorists and their facilitators.”28 The goal of reducing or deterring terrorism
needs to be part of the overall counter-WMD terrorism strategy, but that
is not to say that combating terrorism should be subordinate to countering
WMD terrorism strategy.
Efforts such as the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism
offer an international forum to develop cooperative practices for developing
responses to CBRN terrorism. Creating a strategic national stockpile for both
DOD and DHHS medical countermeasures makes good sense but remains
a slow regulatory-driven process. Critical defense and civil infrastructure
needs to be assessed for vulnerabilities to realistic CBRN hazards. National
special-security events already include CBRN specialists and equipment,
monitoring the environment and preparing to respond to any indication of
an attack. DOD’s technical support to federal agencies is designed to be
interoperable with civilian emergency responder standards and practices.
This is a unique and specialized mission area, distinct from the protection
concept developed for military units operating on a battlefield that may involve the heavy use of NBC weapons.
Disassociating the term “WMD” from the word “terrorism” would
immeasurably improve the effectiveness of a “counter-WMD terrorism”
strategy. The 1999 Gilmore Commission on Homeland Security deliberately used the term “CBRN” in relation to terrorist capabilities, because it
did not believe that “WMD terrorism” was an appropriate descriptor. The
Central Intelligence Agency and Director of National Intelligence carefully avoid using the term WMD in their annual unclassified assessments
of terrorist capabilities.29 Terrorists will not have access to weapons causing
“mass destruction,” other than in the singular and extremely unlikely case
of obtaining a nuclear weapon.30 The most probable terrorist CBRN threats
are toxic inhalation hazards, biological toxins and indigenous diseases, and
radiological materials used in single, small-scale attacks. Despite the fascination with the extremely low probability that a terrorist might obtain a
nuclear weapon, the fact remains that, with the exception of Aum Shinrikyo,
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transnational extremist groups have been unsuccessful in obtaining or using
CBRN hazards to cause a mass casualty event.31
Similar to the consequence-management issue, discussion of CBRN
protection of US military installations and facilities has largely been developed without the active support of antiterrorism experts. Addressing the
CBRN defense aspects of military installations, as a subset of homeland defense, becomes much easier if one uses an integrated base defense using an
“all-hazards” approach. Every installation commander has a responsibility
to protect people within a specific area of responsibility. That responsibility
ends at the gate, in that the installation commander is not responsible for
resourcing a response capability for the civilian community (although available resources can be made available under mutual aid agreements). Every
installation commander has a limited budget to address a number of varied
threats. Many installation commanders do not believe CBRN terrorism to
be a top threat to their facilities and do not want to sustain expensive agent
detectors and to stock medical countermeasures for a threat that may never
appear. Each service and combatant command needs to determine what
capabilities it requires to protect individuals and sustain critical services
during peacetime and conflict.
Conclusion
The Defense Counterproliferation Initiative was a first step toward
advancing strategies addressing adversarial use of WMDs to a “post-Cold
War” concept. Given decreased concerns about Russia’s NBC weapons and
increased concerns about other powers obtaining that capability, it was appropriate to develop a counterproliferation strategy that did not address the use of
nuclear weapons as a deterrent. The joint operating environment has evolved,
however. The “new nuclear triad” has addressed the role of nonnuclear strike
capabilities as a facet of deterrence. Concern about transnational violent
extremist organizations’ use of CBRN hazards, while often unnecessarily
exaggerated, has added a level of complexity to national security concerns.
The US government’s experience in Iraq, searching for a WMD program
that did not exist, must be addressed and its lessons incorporated.
This is fundamentally a question of how the Department of Defense
executes its roles and missions. The counterproliferation community watches trends in the development and movement of WMD-related materials
and technology among nation-states who either have or might be seeking
to develop military NBC weapons. The combating-terrorism community
focuses on violent individuals and transnational groups who are attacking
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US personnel and interests and who may be seeking access to CBRN
hazards. The homeland-security community is concerned with protecting
noncombatants and minimizing risk to emergency responders from domestic CBRN incidents, using occupational safety standards that are very
different from military passive defense requirements. Responsibilities for
these three functions fall under three different Assistants to the Secretary of
Defense for OSD policy, rather than in one central office, with predictable
bureaucratic results.
The DOD, and the US government in general, needs to stop treating
the weapons of mass destruction issues as if they were a special case to be
handled distinct from other national security issues. Far too often, these
issues are discussed separately from conventional military operations or irregular warfare (that is, assuming WMD issues are not just dismissed away
to begin with). As a result, many senior defense leaders push such issues to
the side during war games, discussions on strategy and policy, and within
other defense forums because “someone else” in the US government will
handle them. Although the topic of WMD gets its perfunctory placement in
strategy documents, the senior civilian and military leadership do not value
the development of counter-WMD capabilities.32 As a result, one sees the
confusion, inefficiencies, and lack of readiness apparent in 1990 and again
in 2002 when US military forces prepared for combat against an Iraqi regime thought to be ready to use CB weapons.
Attempts to redress the US military’s nuclear weapons strategy and
infrastructure are well under way. The Perry-Schlesinger Strategic Posture
Commission has correctly identified the need to reinvigorate that capability,
develop appropriate strategies, and ensure that there is an appropriate forum
to discuss policy, budget, and acquisition issues within DOD.33 Similarly,
the dialogue on countering terrorism and insurgencies, and addressing other
nonstate actors, such as pirates and criminals, continues to mature. In order
to ensure that military forces are adequately prepared for adversarial states
with offensive WMD programs as well as nonstate actors using CBRN
hazards, the US government requires two distinct strategies—a counterWMD strategy for states and a counter-CBRN terrorism strategy—that are
linked through common command and control, intelligence sharing, and
planning capabilities.
There are key commonalities to these two proposed national strategies. Both require command and control, intelligence, and planning
capabilities to enable the authorized, combined, and effective use of offenses and defenses to counter WMD attacks or CBRN incidents.34 Both
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use and compete for similar WMD-focused plans and resources required
in executing their operations. Both require aspects of CBRN defense and
incident response but use differing risk management constructs and address differing populations. The two communities do need to coordinate
their technical efforts, since NBC weapons effects and CBRN hazards are
similar in their physical properties. But the goals and implementation strategies must be different to support the two distinct objectives of countering
adversarial WMD capabilities on future battlefields and countering CBRN
terrorism in a global environment.
In addition to separating the strategies addressing state WMD programs and terrorist CBRN ambitions, the US government needs to decide
whether the WMD elimination and interdiction concepts are required as distinct missions. These concepts were developed with a particular worldview
of national security in mind; that nonproliferation efforts were ineffective,
that the number of state WMD programs was growing, and that military
power was the only solution to limiting these materials and technologies
from proliferating to other states and transnational extremist groups. These
views are now suspect and may not be applicable for the future joint operating environment. A more rational and resource-friendly approach is needed.
It may be that the US government cannot change its current counter-WMD dialogue, disproportionately directed by nuclear weapons and
arms-control experts. It is possible that the only strategic WMD discussions will remain focused on nuclear weapons, and that the services and
combatant commands will continue to relegate WMD issues to a low priority. It may be impossible to moderate the overly excited security theater
portraying terrorists as bringing ten-kiloton nuclear bombs to multiple US
cities. But policy analysts need to take a serious, long look at the process
by which the DOD developed its combating WMD strategy and understand
its limitations and failures. With the arrival of a new administration, this is
the time to push for a review on strategies to counter state WMD programs
and terrorist CBRN threats.
NOTES
1. Associated Press, “President Barack Obama Calls Nuclear Terrorism the Top Threat to U.S.,” 6 April
2010,
OregonLive.com,
http://www.oregonlive.com/politics/index.ssf/2010/04/president_barack_obama_
calls_n.html.
2. Nonproliferation activities include those treaties and agreements developed to prevent proliferation of
WMD by dissuading or impeding access to, or distribution of, sensitive technologies, material, and expertise.
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